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Abstract 
 
Using a new historical dataset over the time period 1862-2009, this paper tests the validity of Wagner’s Law of public 
spending (WL) in Italy. To this aim, cointegration and Granger causation are used to investigate the long run 
relationship between GDP and government expenditure. Moreover, DOLS method is applied to estimate consistent long 
run elasticity between these two variables. In contrast to previous studies, we evaluate WL for both total government 
expenditure and some specific items of spending. Our main findings are that WL does not hold in the long run for total 
government expenditure. However, we find strong support for WL in the shorter time span from 1862 to the end of the 
19
th
 century. Here WL is confirmed as regards both total government expenditure and all the specific items of spending 
we have considered. Conversely, in the post-Second World War years, WL holds only for capital expenditure, 
compensation of employees, justice and national security, welfare and redistribution by the state. Thus, it seems that 
Italy invested a great deal and for a long period in infrastructures, justice, national security, and welfare, and less in 
items such as education and culture that play a paramount role in the formation of human capital.  
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1. Introduction
* 
 
 
In the last century, government expenditure underwent constant growth in Western countries. Today 
in Western Europe the public sector absorbs around fifty percent of the national product, and in the 
United States around thirty. This growth in government’s involvement in market economies is one 
of the most debated topics in public economics (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980; Lindert 1994, 1996, 
2004a, 2004b; North and Wallis 1982, Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000).  
A number of explanations have been provided to identify the drivers of growth in public sector. 
Among these, Wagner’s Law of public spending (henceforth WL) has drawn widespread attention. 
WL states that the growth of government expenditure is dependent upon the evolution of society. 
WL suggests three main reasons for increased government involvement in the long run (Wagner 
1883, 1893). Firstly, the increasing complexity of the economy generates increased demand for 
government intervention. The urbanization and greater division of labour accompanying 
industrialization require more government regulation and higher expenditure on contractual 
enforcement and law and order. Another reason is the supposed superior income-elasticity of 
publicly provided goods and services (such as cultural and welfare expenditures). Lastly, the 
growing need to finance large-scale investments with public good characteristics (i.e., 
infrastructures).  
In this perspective, the growth of government expenditure is considered to be a consequence of the 
expansion of the state produced by a country’s social and economic progress.1 Wagner was the first 
to attempt an empirical verification of his hypothesis. He did so for some European countries
2
 
undergoing industrialization in the late 19
th
 century. Subsequent studies tried to verify whether this 
“empirical uniformity” also existed in more recent periods, and whether it has been maintained in 
other contexts: for example, the developing countries of the 20
th
 century.  
Up until the early 1990s, WL received strong support with few exceptions. Since then, however, 
according to a recent review of over forty studies by Durevall and Henrekson (2011), the evidence 
is more controversial: around 35% of these studies fail to find support for WL, while around 30% 
provide indirect support by controlling for other variables or focusing on specific expenditure items, 
and around 35% provide direct support.  
However, there are very few studies that analyse very long time spans and all of them reject WL. 
Henrekson (1993) and Bohl (1996) find no support for WL in Sweden from 1861 to 1990 and in the 
UK from 1870 to 1995. Ghate and Zak (2002) do not find any empirical evidence in the USA from 
1929 to 2000. Durevall and Henrekson (2011) find that in both the UK and Sweden WL does not 
hold in the long run (i.e., in the years 1800-2006 for Sweden and 1830-2006 for the UK); there are, 
however, two shorter time spans during which WL holds: approximately 1860-1913 and 1920-1975 
for both countries. Kuckuck (2014) finds that WL can be rejected in five European countries for the 
                                                          
* We would like to thank Maria Ambrosanio, Giovanna Messina, Aline Pennini, and Paolo Silvestri for their useful help 
in the interpretation of the data provided by the Ragioneria Generale dello Stato. We also thank Federico Biancardi for 
his research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 The major alternative approaches are the displacement effect (Peacock and Wiseman 1961) and the ratchet effect (Bird 
1971) which claim that in a downturn public expenditure declines more slowly than percapita GDP so that public 
expenditure as a share of GDP rises, whereas the reverse occurs in upturns.  
2
 Prussia, Bavaria, England and Switzerland. 
3 
 
whole period 1850-2010. Nevertheless, he finds evidence that WL has a higher validity during early 
stages of development, but becomes weaker at an advanced stage of development.
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Some explanations have been provided to account for the stronger support WL receives in early 
stages of development and especially in the 40-50 years prior to the First World War. Economic 
growth in the late 19
th
 century made it possible for several countries to introduce a system of 
income tax collection more cost-efficient than a system based on custom and excise taxes, which 
allowed an expansion of fiscal capacity that was not possible before (Levi 1988). Moreover, 
Meltzer and Richard (1983) and Lindert (1994, 2004a) argue that government spending grows when 
the franchise is extended to include more voters below the median income level. This led to a 
distribution of income less equal than the distribution of votes, so that voters with the lowest 
incomes pushed the policy-maker to implement redistributional programmes in their own favour. 
Some hypothesis have been put forward also to explain the fading of WL in recent years, i.e., since 
the mid-1970s. Technological and institutional innovation has increased the scope for market-based 
production of social services, i.e., private agents can use insurance and financial markets to handle 
many desired redistributions across individuals and over the life cycle (Durevall and Henrekson 
2011). This change has been spurred by the resurgence of neoliberalism that induced governments 
to cut government spending and carry out massive privatization programmes. Furthermore, since 
the early mid-1990s, globalization has increased the competition between governments to cut taxes 
in order to create a business-friendly environment, thereby undermining their fiscal capacity and 
scope for government spending (Sinn 1998; Bergh and Karlson 2010). 
This paper analyses WL in Italy from 1862 to 2009. It differs from existing studies on this country 
because it relies on a new dataset recently provided by Italy’s State General Accounting Department 
containing data on both total government expenditure and some specific items of spending over a 
long time span of about one and a half century. This allows to address the evolution of the 
composition of government expenditure in response to the changing demands and needs of the 
society.
4
 Our dataset also makes use  of  the most recent series of Italy’s national accounts that have 
been recently produced by the Bank of Italy.  
To this aim, we use cointegration analysis to investigate the long run relationship between 
government expenditure and GDP also taking into account the evolution of population structure. 
Moreover, we test two conditions implicit in WL: the unidirectional Granger causation from GDP 
to government spending and the superior income-elasticity of government spending.  
This paper shows that WL holds for total government expenditure only from 1862 to the end of the 
nineteenth century. Here, WL is confirmed for both total government expenditure and all the 
specific items of spending we have considered. This suggests that the national income, and 
therefore the development process, appear to have played a fundamental role in the creation of a 
more evolved and modern central state.  
Evidence with regard to WL changed for the years after the Second World War, where WL is no 
longer valid for the entirety of government expenditure. WL only holds for expenditure on 
economic affairs and environmental protection; and expenditure on health and social protection in 
the late 1950s- early 1990s.  
                                                          
3
 Detailed reviews of recent empirical studies on WL are presented in Durevall and Henkrenson (2011) and Kuckuck 
(2014). 
4
 Kolluri, Panik and Wahab (2000) study the relationship between GDP and three different items of government 
spending for the shorter time span 1960-93. 
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There is strong evidence in favour of WL for expenditure on education in the period 1862-1939, 
when reducing illiteracy was on top of the agenda of state’s policy, but afterward investment in 
education seems to fade away.  
Furthermore, there three items of spending – capital expenditure, compensation of employees, and 
justice, public order and safety – for which WL is verified for the whole period 1862-2009. 
Thus, our results suggest that Italy invested for a long time in expenditure items such as 
infrastructures, justice, national security, welfare and redistribution by the state, and less in 
education and culture. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the sources and data we have used in our 
analysis. Section 3 illustrates the evolution of Italy’s government spending from 1862 to 2009. 
Section 4 provides a theoretical framework for the empirical analysis, whose results are displayed in 
Section 5. The subsequent Section 6 discusses the results of the empirical analysis, and Section 7 
concludes.    
 
2. Sources and data  
 
We use annual time series data of Italy’s central government spending that comprise the years 
1862-2009. Data on total government expenditure and on the specific economic and functional 
items of spending are at current prices and are drawn from the series that have recently been 
provided by Italy’s State General Accounting Department (Ragioneria Generale dello Stato 2011). 
Spending refers to the total payments disbursed in the year and have been obtained from the final 
budget of the state.
5
 Different items of government spending have been selected, according to their 
economic and functional nature, in order to reveal any empirical evidence in favour of WL, as 
shown in Table 1: 
 
Table 1. Economic and functional categories of government expenditure 
Economic categories: Functional categories: 
Capital expenditure Defense 
Current expenditure Justice, public order and safety 
Compensation of employees Expenditure on economic affairs and on environmental protection 
Expenditure on interests Expenditure on health and on social protection 
 Education and culture 
 
 
Items have calculated by aggregating various chapters of Italy’s state budget according to the 
procedure described in the Appendixes A, B, and C. 
Our data differ from those of the two most recent papers that test WL for Italy. In fact, Magazzino 
(2012) relies on the Informative Public Base (IBP), a database developed by the Bank of Italy that 
covers the shorter 1960-2008 time span and refers to the expenditure of the Italian public 
                                                          
5
 From 1884 to 1964 Italy’s fiscal year ran from July 1st to June 30th. Data have been attributed to the solar years by 
adding half of the expenditures disbursed in two consecutive fiscal years and assuming an equidistribution of the 
expenditure over each fiscal year.  
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administration as a whole, i.e., it includes not just the expenditure of Italy’s central government but 
also the expenditure of local governments (regional, provincial and municipal administrations). Our 
series differ also from those of Kuckuck (2014) who uses data drawn from Mitchell (2007) for the 
years 1850-1995 and from Eurostat for the years 1996-2010. These data are provided by the Italy’s 
State General Accounting Department, but, differently from ours, they refer to the expenses accrued 
and not to the actual payments in the fiscal year. 
For GDP at current prices and real per capita GDP (2010 prices) we rely on the new series of Italy’s 
national accounts that have been recently provided by the Bank of Italy (Baffigi 2011).
6
 Population 
data are from the Ricostruzione della popolazione residente e del bilancio demografico database 
(Istat 2012).  
 
 
3. The evolution of Italy’s government spending 
 
In the first fifty years following Unification, Itay’s total government spending in real terms 
increased slowly. On average, total spending growth did not exceed that of national income. 
However, as can be seen in Figure 1, there were drastic swings from one year to the next, with 
peaks in the mid-1860s and in the latter half of the 1880s. Between 1862 and the mid-1890s, the 
share of total government spending compared to GDP and the growth in real per-capita GDP show 
very similar trends. Subsequently, the two series diverge considerably: the per-capita GDP begins to 
grow at much faster rates compared to previous years,
7
 while total spending as a share of GDP 
drops constantly until the outbreak of the First World War.  
On average, between 1862 and 1913 total government spending was around 10% of GDP and was 
mostly destined for defence and interest payments on public debt. In the first decade after 
Unification, the share of government spending for public works was around 10% of the total, and 
increased to 20% after 1870, staying on those levels until 1904, when it began to rise again to above 
30% in 1909. The majority of spending for public works (around three-quarters) was destined for 
railway construction: the railway expanded from 1,829 km prior to Unification to 16,210 km in 
1913 (Cohen and Federico 2001). Spending for education and culture also increased constantly 
from Unification to the First World War, both as a percentage of total state spending (from 1.6 to 
5%) and as a percentage of the GDP. 
Participation in the First World War led to a drastic increase of total government spending, from 
just over 10% to more than 35% of the GDP. In the years after the conflict, it dropped again, in 
1926 settling to the pre-war values compared to the GDP. Spending returned to its pre-war 
composition; defence costs dropped, while investments in public works and other economic 
                                                          
6
 Our data differ from those of Kuckuck (2014), who for the years 1850-1995 relies on the GDP series published by 
Mitchell (2007). The latter are drawn from Istat’s (1957) first series of Italy’s national accounts, that were only partially 
improved by a team of scholars led by the economist Giorgio Fuà (1969). These series are heavily flawed (Cohen and 
Federico 2001) so that on the occasion of the 150
th
 anniversary of Italy’s political unification, the Bank of Italy 
launched the project for a thorough reconstruction of the nation’s national accounts, on which we rely. For the years 
1996-2010 Kuckuck (2014) makes use of data on central government expenditure from Eurostat and on national income 
from the International Financial Statistic database of the IMF. 
7
 An econometric analysis conducted by Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea (2007) underlines a structural break in the dynamics 
of per-capita GDP in Italy around 1895. 
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interventions resumed. The investments in the railways was particularly significant, with the 
construction of the express lines and the electrification of the main lines, as well as the first toll 
motorways (Felice 2015). 
Between the end of the Second World War and 1963, total government spending increased 
drastically in real terms. Despite this, it remained well below 25% of a GDP which was growing at 
rates that had never before been recorded in the history of Italy (Fig. 2). The state budget began to 
suffer in the second half of the 1960s. However, in 1970, despite a relevant deficit (3.7%) the total 
public spending (33%) and the primary current expenditure (27%) were, compared to the GDP, 
below the average of the EEC countries (Ciocca 2007). 
From the 1950s a substantial change was recorded in the composition of government spending. 
After the defeat of the Second World War, Italy was prohibited from reconstructing its own 
independent military power. This led to a drastic reduction in defence spending, both compared to 
the GDP and in terms of overall government spending (De Cecco 2003). On the other hand, the 
social components of spending increased: infrastructures, welfare, and redistributing action. Most 
social spending increases concerned pensions, for seniority, old age and invalidity (Franco 1993). 
From the mid-1970s state spending began to grow more rapidly than the GDP, reaching a maximum 
peak of 44% in 1986 (Figure 2). In 1983 Italy reached the European average in the ratio between 
government spending and GDP, and from that moment on systematically exceeded it (Ciocca 
2007). 
In 1978, the creation of a universalistic welfare system and the redistributing action of public 
spending – driven by the social conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s – contributed to a rapid reduction 
in the inequality of income distribution and poverty in Italy. From 1968 to 1982 the percentage of 
poor people fell from 20 to 3.6%, while in absolute terms the number fell from 11 to 2 million 
(Felice 2015). 
From 1993, with a view to Italy’s signing up to the single European currency, the imbalance of the 
national accounts began to be tackled, and clear results were seen in 1995, making decisive progress 
in 1997, when the deficit dropped to 2.7% of the GDP, below the 3% laid down in the Maastricht 
Treaty. However, after Italy joined the Euro, public spending began to increase once more in 
absolute terms, with frequent swings compared to the GDP (Ciocca 2007).  
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Fig. 1. Total government expenditure as a share of GDP and real per capita GDP (1862-1945) 
 
 
Fig. 2. Total government expenditure as a share of GDP and real per capita GDP (1946-2009) 
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4. Theoretical framework  and empirical analysis  
 
As originally formulated by Musgrave (1969) and recently proposed by Shelton (2007) and 
Durevall and Henrekson (2011), we employ the following specification to model WL:  
tt yg             (1)  
where g is the log of total government expenditure in nominal terms as a share of nominal GDP, and 
y is the log of real per capita GDP.  
Eq. (1) is a long run relationship between government spending and national income and β is a long 
run coefficient that according to WL should be higher than 0. In this case, the government 
expenditure increases faster than GDP, i.e. government expenditure is income elastic, or in other 
words it is a superior good.
8
 As stressed by Durevall and Henrekson (2011), Eq. (1) is probably the 
most common specification for modelling WL, and most models in the literature are reformulations 
of it. Contrary to the alternative specification that consists of total government expenditure and 
GDP, it has the advantage, by using real per capita GDP, of better considering a nation’s prosperity 
and spending capacity of its citizens. In fact, the latter is the crucial variable to model the evolution 
of the demand for public services. Moreover, the use in Eq. (1) of total government expenditure as a 
share of GDP instead of real total government expenditure considers the possibility of differences in 
productivity growth of government and private sector production lead to an increase in government 
spending due to “Baumol’s disease”.9 
To test for the existence of a long run relationship between g and y, we reformulate Eq. (1) as 
follows  
ttt uyg             (2) 
Eq. (2) is a simple econometric model to estimate the long run parameter β. But, if g and y are non- 
stationary variables, i.e. they contain a unit root, this invalidates conventional statistical inferences 
and hypothesis tests on β. Hence, we need to analyse the integration properties of government 
expenditure (and all its items) and national income performing ADF test (OLS/GLS) and KPSS 
tests. From these tests, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity for the levels 
and stationarity for the first differences of all the series: they are I(1). The ADF and KPSS results 
are not presented here for space consideration.
10
  
Although I(1) series tend to wander over time without returning to a constant mean, economic 
forces should not allow these variables to wander apart in a permanent way. In this case, these 
series share a common path of growth and at least one of the two variables has to adjust to 
deviations from this long run path. In other words, if there is a long run relationship between g and 
y, movements in the former must respond to disequilibrium in the latter, or vice versa, and the 
disequilibrium from the long run path is transitory. Cointegration offers one method to check if WL 
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 The elasticity ε of total government expenditure to GDP is linked to the  parameter in Eq. (1) by the following 
relationship: ε = (1 + ). This is the reason why ε > 1 (implicit in WL) requires  > 0 in Eq. (1). 
9
 “Baumol’s desease” involves a rise of wages in jobs – i.e., in the government sector – that have experienced no 
increase of labour productivity in response to rising wages in other jobs – i.e., in private sector production – which 
experienced such labour productivity growth. The rise of wages in jobs without productivity gains is caused by the 
requirement to compete for employees with jobs that experienced gains and hence can naturally pay higher salaries 
(Baumol 1967).  
10
 The results of these tests are reported in a preliminary version of this paper. See Pistoresi, Rinaldi and Salsano (2015).  
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holds. If there is a positive long run path between g and y, WL would require at least that the 
estimated residual tu  in Eq. (2) be stationary, i.e. I(0). In this case, g and y share a common 
stochastic and deterministic trend, this is the so-called deterministic cointegration.  
We also check for a less stringent concept of long run relationship implicit in the definition of  
stochastic cointegration. If stochastically cointegrated, g and y share a common stochastic trend but 
different deterministic trends. It is useful when government expenditure and national income are not 
deterministically cointegrated (Eq. 2). We test for stochastic cointegration by using the following 
specification: 
ttt utrendyg           (3)  
If g and y are not cointegrated as stated by Eq. (2), we additionally test for cointegration by 
augmenting Eq. (2) by the Dependency ratio, i.e. controlling for the age structure of population as in 
Durevall and Henrekson (2011)
11
  
tttt uDRyg           (4) 
Where the Dependency ratio is 
6415
65140

 
POP
POPPOP
DR  . That is, the DR is defined as those aged 0-14 
and 65+, divided by those aged 15-64. This measure should capture spending connected to policy 
reforms that should have substantially strengthened the link between government expenditure and 
the age structure of population, such as expenditures on child care, schooling, pensions, and health 
care. 
For all these cases (Eq. 2, 3, 4), we test cointegration by Engle and Granger (1987) procedure 
performing ADF tests on the estimated residual tu  with the asymptotic p-values for cointegration 
proposed by MacKinnon (1996).  
Note that WL firstly requires that a long run relationship exists, i.e. that g and y are cointegrated 
and then that g Granger-causes y in the long run and not vice versa (unidirectional long run 
causality). To this aim, we estimate the Error Correction Models in Eq. (5) and Eq. (6). We test that 
the error correction parameter δ in Eq. (5) be statistically significant (one side t-test), while 
~
 in 
Eq. (6) be not suggesting that only g adjusts to the long run equilibrium. In fact, WL suggests that 
government expenditure reacts to a change in national income in the long run driven, for example, 
by a change in the demand for public goods consequent on increasing prosperity.   
  
 
 
m
i
n
j
ttjtjitit ECTybgag
1 1
1       (5) 
 
 
 
m
i
n
j
ttjtjitit ECT
~
ybgay
1 1
1       (6) 
Hence, WL requires cointegration between g and y, unidirectional causality from y to g, and also 
that β be greater than zero. The statistical inference on the long run parameter β may be problematic 
if levels representation of g and y contains a unit root and even if g and y are cointegrated. In fact, 
the OLS estimator of the coefficient in the cointegration regression is consistent, but the OLS 
estimator has non-normal distribution and the inference based on its t-statistics be misleading. To 
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 Including the Dependency ratio increases the probability to find cointegration among the series. Moreover it is 
possible to imagine the Dependency ratio to work like the “particular trend” in the stochastic cointegration framework.  
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avoid this problem, we use DOLS (Dynamic Ordinary Least Square) estimator suggested by Stock 
and Watson (1993). The DOLS is based on a modified version of Eq. (2) that includes past, present 
and future values of changes in y:  
tjt
p
pj
tt uyyg  

         (7) 
If g and y are cointegrated, DOLS is efficient in large samples and statistical inference about β 
based on HAC standard errors has a standard normal distribution in large samples.
12
 Hence, thanks 
to this efficient estimator, on Eq. (5) we can consistently test the superior income elasticity of 
government spending implicit in WL: 0:,0: 10 
dolsdols HH  . Moreover, we also study the 
degree of income elasticity of government expenditure testing 1:,1: 10 
dolsdols HH  .  
 
5. Results 
 
In this section we present the result of our empirical analysis with regard to both total government 
expenditure and to the selected items of economic and functional categories of spending as defined 
in Table 1.  
Tables 2 and 3 present the cointegration results according to the long run regression stated by Eqs. 
(2), (3) and (4). Only for cointegrated series, Tables 4 and 5 outline the findings about Granger 
causation from the estimated ECM in Eq. (5) and (6).  
We stress that the Granger causation result is always unidirectional from y to g in all the cases 
considered, as suggested by WL. For this reason, in the remainder of this section, we will not return 
to comment the Granger causality results again. Finally, Tables 4 and 5 also present the inference 
on the long run parameter β estimated by DOLS. 
Note that in all the Tables, findings are presented for the whole period 1862-2009 and for the two 
shorter sub-periods 1862-1939 and 1948-2009. There are two main reasons for this periodization:
13
 
1) The Second World War represents the most significant watershed in post-unification Italy. It 
was then that for a certain period (from September 1943 to April 1945), the unified Italian 
state disappeared, with the partition of the country between the Kingdom of the South (allied 
to the Anglo-Americans) and the Italian Social Republic (allied to Nazi Germany). The 
conflict also led to the sharper institutional break-up in the country’s recent history: the 
abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of the republic in 1946. For the purposes of 
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 The first efficient estimator was developed by Johansen (1988) in a multivariate framework. Having only two 
variables, just one cointegrating vector is possible and bivariate VAR models are not necessary to test for cointegration. 
Moreover, in our case the Johansen (1988) procedure produces the same cointegration results as the Engle-Granger test. 
Results are available on request.  
13
 Apart from a historical viewpoint or that of the quality of the data discussed above, the sub-periods selected are 
consistent with an analysis of the breaks. We find that in 1946 there was a structural break in the historical series of 
GDP that already justifies this periodization. Moreover, the various historical series of expenditure show other 
significant breaks at times that are not always uniform but consistent with our periodization. The breaks we find are 
consistent with those that are found for Italy in Kuckuck (2014). Our results are available on request.  
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this study, therefore, there is justification for breaking the analysis down into the periods 
prior to (1862-1939) and following (1948-2009) the Second World War. 
2) Disaggregation of the analysis into shorter sub-periods is often present in the literature on 
other countries, and several authors have suggested it is an effective method of 
investigation. When Durevall and Henrekson (2011) were unable to obtain significant 
results from their analysis of co-integration over the long period 1800-2006 with regard to 
the UK and Sweden, they examined the two sub-periods 1800-1913 and 1920-2006, and 
subsequently also the four shorter sub-periods 1800-1859, 1860-1913, 1920-1973, and 
1974-2006. An approach of this kind was also adopted by Kuckuck (2014), who evaluated 
WL for five countries (the UK, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Italy) between 1850 and 
2010 in relation to their various stages of development approximated by three classes of per 
capita GDP.  
Table 2 shows that total government spending and national income are not co-integrated over the 
entire 1862-2009 time span. These results confirm the claim made in the literature on other 
European countries that WL does not hold in the long run.
14
 
The analysis in sub-periods (Tables 2 and 4) suggests that WL holds for total government 
expenditure between 1862 and 1897, with 90.1dols , while as regards the post-Second World 
War period it holds in the years 1980-2009 with a negative β = - 0.46. The latter result implies an 
elasticity of total government expenditure to GDP that is less than unity. In other words, total 
government spending during that period grew less than proportionally to national income. 
These results are in line with those of other studies on other countries for the years from the mid- 
19
th
 century to the outbreak of the First World War, which also find strong support for WL 
(although in our case, evidence in favour of WL ends in 1897).
15
 
Conversely, Italy seems to diverge from some major European nations in the post-Second World 
War years. In fact, Durevall and Henrekson (2011) find evidence in favour of WL during the 
“Golden Age” – i.e., the 30 to 35 years after the Second World War – which was not the case in 
Italy.  
The absence of a relation à la Wagner with regard to total government expenditure over the entire 
period 1862-2009 is due to the behaviour of current expenditure, which only co-integrates with 
GDP until the beginning of the 20
th
 century, and to that of the expenditure on interests, which only 
co-integrates with the national income until 1939. However, Tables 2 and 3 show that WL is 
verified over the entire period 1862-2009 with regard to other significant items of government 
spending: capital expenditure (β = 0.59) and compensation of employees (β = 0.32) among the 
economic categories; and justice, public order and safety among functional categories (β = 0.17).  
Detailed examination of items of spending by functional category (Tables 3 and 5) shows that WL 
holds over the entire sub-period 1862-1939 for all of them, with the exception of expenditure on 
defence, for which the relationship is valid only until 1913. The reason for this result is that the 
explosion of military expenditure during the First World War and its rapid reduction in the years 
                                                          
14
 Thus, Durevall and Henrekson (2011) do not support WL in the years 1800-2006 for Sweden and 1830-2006 for the 
UK. Similarly, Kuckuck (2014) rejects WL for the UK, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Italy over the period between 
1850 and 2010. 
15
 See Thornton (1999) for Denmark, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and the UK, Durevall and Henrekson (2011) 
for Sweden and the UK, and Kuckuck (2014) for Denmark, Finland, Italy, Sweden, and the UK. 
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immediately after the conflict gave to this item a dynamics significantly different from that of real 
per capita GDP in the years 1914-1939. 
Expenditure on economic affairs and on environmental protection and expenditure on health and on 
social protection do not co-integrate with national income over the entire period 1862-2009. 
However, they moved with GDP from 1862 to 1939, and subsequently from the early 1960s to the 
early 1990s. In particular, WL holds for the expenditure on health and social protection with 
1dols  in both sub-periods (β = 7.09 in the years 1862-1939 and β = 1.57 in the years 1960-1992). 
Table 5 also shows that investment in education and culture at an early stage of development – from 
1862 to 1939 – was very high, with 243.dols  , but then it seems to fade away and ßdols falls to 0.22 
from 1980 to 2009.  
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Table 2.  Engle - Granger residual based cointegration test results 
Economic categories Period Deterministic 
cointegration. 
Pvalue 
Deterministic 
cointegration + 
dependecy ratio. 
Pvalue 
Stochastic cointegration. 
Pvalue 
Total government 
expenditure 
1862-2009 0.15 0,28 0.30 
Capital expenditure 1862-2009 0.0007***   
Current expenditure 1862-2009 0.21 0.21 0.21 
         of which 
compensation of 
employees 
1862-2009 0.002**   
Expenditure on interests 1862-2009 0.75 0,88 0.76 
1862-1939 
Total government 
expenditure 
1862-1939 0.17 0.34 0.40 
Total government 
expenditure 
1862-1897 0.027**   
     
Current expenditure 1862-1939 0.29 0.50 0.50 
Current expenditure 1862-1901 0.09*   
Expenditure on interests 1862-1939 0.06*   
1948-2009 
Total government 
expenditure 
1948-2009 0.37 0.74 0.46 
Total government 
expenditure 
1980-2009 0.01**   
Current expenditure 1948-2009 0.51 0.76 0.70 
Expenditure on interests 1948-2009 0.84 0.80 0.98 
 
Note: Asymptotic pvalues for cointegration from MacKinnon (1996). ***,**,*  indicate that the null of no cointegration is rejected at 
the 1%, 5%, 10% significance level, respectively.  
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Table 3.  Engle - Granger residual based cointegration test results  
Functional categories Period Deterministic 
cointegration. 
Pvalue 
Deterministic 
cointegration + 
dependecy ratio. 
Pvalue 
Stochastic cointegration. 
Pvalue 
Defense 1862-2009 0,33 0,52 0,21 
Justice, public order and 
safety 
1862-2009 0,003***   
Expenditure on economic 
affairs and on 
environmental protection 
1862-2009 0,106 0,24 0,30 
Expenditure on health and 
on social protection 
1862-2009 0,70 0,85 0,13 
Education and culture 1862-2009 0,58 0,76 0,64 
1862-1939 
Defense 1862-1939 0.35 0.58 0.54 
Defense 1862-1913 0,02**   
Expenditure on economic 
affairs and on 
environmental protection 
1862-1939 0,02**   
Expenditure on health and 
on social protection 
1862-1939 0,08*   
Education and culture 1862-1939 0,01**   
1948-2009 
Defense 1948-2009 0.14 0.25 0.23 
Defense 1980-2009 0,03**   
Expenditure on economic 
affairs and on 
environmental protection 
1948-2009 0.87 0.96 0.39 
Expenditure on economic 
affairs and on 
environmental protection 
1957-1987 0,06*   
Expenditure on health and 
on social protection 
1948-2009 0.37 0.52 0.57 
Expenditure on health and 
on social protection 
1960-1992 0,07*   
Education and culture 1948-2009 0.30 0.33 0.37 
Education and culture 1980-2009 0,03**   
 
Note: Asymptotic pvalues for cointegration from MacKinnon (1996). ***,**,*  indicate that the null of no cointegration is rejected at 
the 1%, 5%, 10% significance level, respectively.  
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Table 4. Granger causality test results. Estimated consistent cointegration parameter results (DOLS) and 
tests of 0:,0: 10 
dolsdols HH   or 1:,1: 10 
dolsdols HH   
Economic 
categories 
Period y→g 
Test 
on
a  
2
R from 
ECM in 
Eq.3 
g→y 
Test on
b
~
 
2
R  from 
ECM  in 
Eq.4 
DOLS  
 
Test on 
DOLS  
 
Capital 
expenditure 
1862-2009 -0.17*** 
(0.005) 
0.14 -0.007 
(0.006) 
0.29 0.59*** 
[0.073] 
β > 0 
 
Compensation 
of employees 
1862-2009 -0.30*** 
(0.058) 
0.17 -0.012 
(0.008) 
0.25 0.32*** 
[0.02] 
β > 0 
 
1862-1939 
Total 
government 
expenditure 
1862-1897 -0.56** 
(0.01) 
0.32 0.059 
(0.37) 
0.053 1.90*** 
[0,27] 
β > 1 
 
Current 
expenditure 
1862-1901 -0.31** 
(0.01) 
0.29 0.003 
(0.94) 
0.14 1.77*** 
[0,425] 
β > 1 
 
Expenditure on 
interests 
1862-1939 -0.15** 
(0.01) 
0.33 0.005 
(0.88) 
-0.07 1.13** 
[0,474] 
β > 0 
 
1948-2009 
Total 
government 
expenditure 
1980-2009 -0.71*** 
(0.001) 
0.33 0.11*** 
(0.002) 
0.46 -0.46** 
[0,17] 
β < 0 
 
 
Note: All the Granger causality t-tests reported above are from ECM (1,1). The number of lags of the ECMs is chosen by information 
criteria. Results are available on request. The letters a and b indicate the test of significance of the error corretion terms, a  and 
b
~
, 
their p-values in parentheses (.). 2R indicates the adjusted R-squared. Values in parentheses [.] are HAC standard errors for  the long 
run parameter, DOLS .  
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Table 5.  Granger causality test results. Estimated consistent cointegration parameter results (DOLS) and 
tests of 0:,0: 10 
dolsdols HH   or 1:,1: 10 
dolsdols HH   
Functional 
categories 
Period y→g 
Test 
on
a  
2
R from 
ECM in 
Eq.3 
g→y 
Test on
b
~
 
2
R  from 
ECM  in 
Eq.4 
DOLS  
 
Test on 
DOLS  
 
Justice, public 
order and safety 
1862-2009 -0.26*** 
(0.00) 
0.14 -0.005 
(0.37) 
0.16 0.17*** 
[0.021] 
β >0 
 
1862-1939 
Defense 1862-1913 -0.20* 
(0.07) 
0.46 -0.013 
(0.58) 
0.18 0,904*** 
[0,330] 
β >0 
 
Expenditure on 
economic 
affairs and on 
environmental 
protection 
1862-1939 -0.30*** 
(0.001) 
0.13 0.042* 
(0.08) 
0.05 1.03*** 
[0.268] 
 β >0 
 
Expenditure on 
health and on 
social protection 
1862-1939 -0.13*** 
(0.004) 
0.13 -0.05*** 
(0.003) 
-0.01 7,09*** 
[0,522] 
 β >1 
Education and 
culture 
1862-1939 -0.20*** 
(0.005) 
0.11 0.09*** 
(0.005) 
0.11 3,24*** 
[0,187] 
 
 β >1 
1948-2009 
Defense 1980-2009 -0.43*** 
(0.005) 
0.20 -0.03 
(0.18) 
0.37 -0.25 
[1.00] 
 
 
--- 
Expenditure on 
economic 
affairs and on 
environmental 
protection 
1957-1987 -0.50*** 
(0.002) 
0.32 0.01 
(0.55) 
0.05 1,08***  
[0,157] 
 β >0 
 
Expenditure on 
health and on 
social protection 
1960-1992 -0.44*** 
(0.009) 
0.19 0.003 
(0.87) 
-0.04 1,57*** 
[0,163] 
 β >1 
Education and 
culture 
1980-2009 0.27** 
(0.01) 
0.27 0.02 
(0.51) 
0.39 0,225** 
[0,09] 
 β >0 
 
 
Note: All the Granger causality t-tests reported above are from ECM (1,1). The number of lags of the ECMs is chosen by information 
criteria. Results are available on request. The letters a and b indicate the test of significance of the error corretion terms, 
a  and 
b
~
, their p-values in parentheses (.).
2
R indicates the adjusted R-squared. Values in parentheses [.] are HAC standard errors for  the 
long run parameter, DOLS . ---means that the parameter is not statistically significant.  
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6. Discussion 
 
The overall results of our econometric analysis show a strong support for WL in the years from 
Italy’s political unification in 1861 to the end of the 19th century. Here WL holds for both total 
government expenditure and all the specific items of spending we have selected, whether economic 
or functional. One gains the impression that the increasing incidence of government expenditure on 
GDP was a consequence of the efforts made by Italian governments to construct the framework of 
the new state, endowing it with indispensable infrastructures both organisational (a functioning 
central and peripheral administration) and physical (roads, ports, a rail network and a national 
telegraph service) (Cohen and Federico 2001). A similar purpose was served by the power strategy 
precociously adopted by the Italian state in order to ensure its survival in the European geopolitics 
of the time (De Cecco 2003).  
Also expenditure on education and culture at that time seems to have been part of a nation-building 
strategy. In fact, one of the greatest issues the Italian ruling class had to address when Italy became 
a nation-state was the creation of a unitary conscience among its citizens. In this respect, reduction 
of illiteracy was of a paramount importance and this task was largely assigned to government 
schools. The Coppino Law of 1877
16
 was a turning-point that ensured that in the future closer 
attention and greater resources would be devoted to the educational and institutional problems of 
the younger generation. Growing expenditure on health and social protection was also instrumental 
to the construction of the infrastructure of the new state. 
Thus, the case of Italy in the years from political unification to the outbreak of the First World War 
seems to be principally referable to the theory of independent action of the state, defined on the 
basis of the internal and international political objectives conceived by state policy-makers, and not 
as a response to a growing demand by its citizens for higher-category goods, as Wagner theorised 
(Mann 1984). With regard to this period, one finds unconvincing the explanations offered by the 
literature to account for the increase in government spending in the principal European countries in 
correspondence with the early stage of industrialisation – between mid-19th and early-20th century – 
and the extension of electoral suffrage to low-income voters. The latter induced median voters to 
prefer an increase in taxes, which would principally affect the segment of voters with incomes 
higher than theirs, in order to yield the resources to be used to finance new social programmes with 
strong redistributive content (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Persson and Tabellini 1990; Lindert 1994). 
However, suffrage in Italy during this period was extremely limited: 2% of the population had the 
right to vote in 1861; this was increased to 7% in 1880 and to 23% only in 1913, at which time the 
evidence in favour of WL had already weakened (Ballini 1988).  
One interpretation that might be considered for this period is the one offered by Douglass North to 
explain the growth of government expenditure in the USA over the same period. He associates the 
demand for greater government expenditure with technological changes: “Technological changes 
have led to an enormous increase in specialisation and division of labour, and therefore a radical 
change in relative prices which fundamentally altered the traditional structure of the polity, the 
family, and economic organisation. The variety of interest groups that emerged from this expanded 
                                                          
16
 This law imposed sanctions on those who evaded their educational obligations. In fact, the commitment to rendering 
school attendance compulsory, at least for a three-year period between the ages of six and nine, brought improvements 
not only in terms of the resources allocated to the educational sector, but also in terms of the independence of teachers, 
and closer attention was paid to the problems of technical and professional training. The law also reorganised 
elementary school attendance, which was extended from four to five years, the first three of which were compulsory. 
See Sarracino and Corbi (2004). 
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division of labour led to political pluralism. The demand for new institutional forms of organisation 
to replace functions previously undertaken by the family and traditional economic organisation 
could not be completely realized by voluntary organisations because of moral hazard, adverse 
selection, and the demand for public goods.” (North 1985: 392).   
The years 1914-1939 constitute a particularly crisis-ridden period with the First World War, the 
post-war downturn, and the Great Depression. Thus, it is not surprising that in these years we find 
not support for WL for total government expenditure, even if, as we have seen, it holds for some 
specific items of spending: capital expenditure; economic affairs and environmental protection; 
health and on social protection; justice and national security; education and culture. This was 
principally consequent on the effort in nation-building and social control by the Fascist regime.  
Evidence with regard to WL changed for the years after the Second World War. In this period, WL 
is no longer valid for the entirety of government expenditure. However, WL holds for some specific 
items of spending. Amongst them, capital expenditure stands out. In fact, capital expenditure meant 
that the state intervened in the economy far more decisively than it had done with transfers. The 
latter, in that they consisted of the redistribution of monetary resources, did not affect the relative 
magnitudes of the public and private sectors in terms of production. The intervention of the Italian 
state began after the First World War and culminated in the 1933 with the creation of the big state-
owned holding IRI (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale) that took over Italy’s three largest 
universal banks and their industrial securities.
17
 State intervention further expanded after the Second 
World War with a massive provision of subsidized credit and grants to enterprises. In face of the 
weakness of the private sector, the state-owned enterprises (the energy giant ENI was added to IRI 
in 1953, and EFIM followed in 1961 in the mechanical engineering industry) played a crucial role 
in the development of capital-intensive sectors – steel, heavy industry, energy, motorways, and 
telephony – in which the investments required were too high and profitability too long deferred to 
be within the capacities of private investors. They therefore acted as a “substitution factor” à la 
Gerschenkron for the missing prerequisites for the country’s industrialisation (Gerschenkron 1962; 
Amatori 2000; Toninelli 2004). As a result, the influence of state-owned enterprises in Italy grew 
constantly and only diminished with the privatisations of the 1990s.
18
 
In the post-Second World War years WL holds also for compensation on employees, and justice 
and national security. The former is someway a necessary consequence of the expansion of state 
administration. The latter is a fundamental service required of the state, whose expansion is driven 
by the growing demand for regulation and the enforceability of contracts that arises as a society 
becomes more complex and the division of labour increases (Kuznets 1967; North and Wallis 
1982). Moreover, Italy’s pro-American stance during the Cold War and the possibility that the 
Italian Communist Party (the largest Communist party in the Western world) might organise a 
revolution meant that a large proportion of government expenditure was allocated to national 
security. In the 1970s, this expenditure was further increased to tackle political terrorism. 
As we have seen, from the late 1950s to the late 1980s there is evidence in support of WL also for 
the expenditure on economic affairs and on environmental protection and, from the early 1960s to 
the early 1990s, for the expenditure on health and on social protection. This seems to reflect the 
growth of the economic and social components of expenditure: infrastructure, welfare, and 
redistribution by the state. Under pressure from the expansion of suffrage (universal suffrage was 
                                                          
17
 At the time when IRI was created, the companies comprising it possessed 83% of the share capital of joint-stock 
companies operating in Italy in the telephone sector, 56% in shipping, 39% in the banking sector, 38% in steel works, 
29% in the electricity sector, and 21% in the machinery industry (Cianci 1977, pp. 278-79).  
18
 The percentage of the total of share capital of Italian joint stock companies held by IRI, ENI and EFIM rose from 
12.5% in 1936 to 22.7% in 1952, to 32.1% in 1972, and to 40.2% in 1983 (Toninelli and Vasta 2010, Table 3.4).  
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introduced in 1946), and, from the end of the 1960s, of an unprecedented wave of social struggles, a 
progressive expansion of welfare services to new social categories took place in Italy until a 
universalistic welfare system was introduced in 1978 (Franco 1993). 
WL, however, no longer holds in recent years. Between 1980 and 2009, total government 
expenditure actually grew less than proportionately to GDP. From the beginning of the 1990s – the 
period during which budget deficits were reduced in anticipation of adhesion to the single European 
currency – there is no support for WL even for expenditure on economic affairs and on 
environmental protection and for expenditure on health and on social protection. Nonetheless, WL 
returns to be verified for spending in education and culture, even though evidence is much weaker 
than in the period prior to 1939. 
  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This paper has found a strong evidence in favour of WL in Italy in the years immediately after 
national unification, between 1862 and the end of the 19
th
 century. Here WL is confirmed for both 
total government expenditure and all the specific items of spending we have considered. The 
national income, and therefore the development process, appear to have played a fundamental role 
in the creation of a more evolved and modern central state. 
Our impression is that, in the post-unitary period, the increasing incidence of state expenditure on 
GDP was a consequence of the efforts made by Italian governments to construct the framework of 
the new state, with the creation of indispensable organisational and physical infrastructures, the 
reduction of illiteracy and the formation of a national conscience among its citizens. A similar 
purpose was served by the power strategy precociously adopted by the Italian state in order to 
ensure its survival in the European geopolitics of the time. Thus, maybe paradoxically, evidence for 
WL seems to have been principally the consequence of an independent action of the Italian state, 
defined by the political objectives autonomously conceived by state policy-makers, and not of a 
response to a growing demand by its citizens for higher-category goods, as Wagner hypothesized. 
Evidence for more recent years is different. In the post-Second World War years we find no support 
for WL for total government expenditure. Now WL holds only for some specific items of spending: 
capital expenditure, compensation of employees, and justice and national security. The former 
seems to stress the persisting strategic role of public investment in an economy, such as Italy, in 
which private big business is weaker than in the other major industrialized nations. Compensation 
of employees is a necessary consequence of the expansion of state administration. Justice and 
national security are fundamental services whose expansion is driven by the growing demand for 
regulation and the enforceability of contracts that arises as a society becomes more complex and the 
division of labour increases. Moreover, Italy’s pro-American stance during the Cold War and the 
fear that the Communist Party might organise a revolution pushed the government to allocate a 
large proportion of government expenditure to national security. From the late 1950s to the early 
1990s WL holds also for major economic and social components of expenditure: infrastructure, 
welfare and redistribution by the state.  
Overall, it seems that Italy invested for a long time in infrastructures, justice, national security, and 
welfare (to which WL applies for large part of the period under consideration), and less in education 
and culture, where the investment seems to have been substantial only until 1939. Although this 
20 
 
may have served to strengthen the state and to respond to the growing demand on the part of society 
for public services, it might not be true that it also served to prompt economic growth. In fact, it is 
controversial whether welfare has an expansionary effect on the economy, while investment in 
education and human capital is one of the fundamental determinants of economic growth. 
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Appendix A. Government spending by economic category 
 
Economic category Economic categories in 
the budget documents 
from 2000 to 2009 
Economic categories in the 
budget documents from 
1968 to 2000 
Reconstruction of the 
RGS (General 
Accounting Office) 
volume (1969) for the 
years from 1862 to 1967 
1 
Current expenditure in the 
production of services 
   
Production taxes Category III – Retired staff   
Intermediate consumption Category IV – Purchase of 
goods and services 
Purchase of goods and 
services 
  Category I – Constitutional 
body services 
  
2 
of which: Compensation of 
employees 
Employee income Category II – Staff in active 
service 
Staff expenditure 
Production taxes Category III – Retired staff 
3 
Capital expenditure in the 
production of services 
Fixed gross investments 
and purchase of land 
Category X – Goods and 
building works paid directly 
by the State 
Goods and building works 
paid directly by the State 
  Category XI – Moveable 
goods, machinery and 
technical-scientific 
equipment paid directly by 
the State 
Moveable goods, 
machinery and technical-
scientific equipment paid 
directly by the State 
4 
Current transfers within 
general government, to 
enterprises and to 
households 
Own EEC resources Category V – Transfers Current transfers 
Transfers to businesses   Retired staff 
Current transfers abroad     
Current transfers to 
families and social 
institutions  
    
Current transfers to 
families and private social 
institutions 
    
Current transfers to 
businesses 
    
Current transfers  to public 
administrations 
    
5 
Capital transfers to general 
government, to enterprises 
and to households 
Other capital transfers   Capital transfers 
Investment funding Category XII – Transfers   
Investment funding abroad Category XIV- Granting of 
loans and advances for 
production purposes 
Granting of loans and 
advances for production 
purposes 
Investment funding for 
families and institutions  
Category XV – Granting of 
loans and advances for non-
production purposes 
Granting of loans and 
advances for non-
production purposes 
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Investment funding for 
families and private social 
institutions  
    
Investment funding for 
businesses 
    
6 
Interest 
Interest expenses and 
income from capital  
Category VI – Interests Interests 
7 
Loan repayments 
Title III – Loan 
repayments 
Title III – Loan repayments Loan repayments 
8 
Other expenses 
    Non-attributable current 
and capital expenditure 
Amortizations Category VIII – 
Amortizations 
Amortizations 
Other current expenditure     
Purchase of financial assets Category XIII – Shares and 
contributions 
Shares and contributions 
Adjusting and offsetting 
entries 
Category VII – Adjusting 
and offsetting income entries  
Adjusting and offsetting 
income entries 
    Miscellaneous expenditure 
Source: RGS (2011). From 1862 to 1967, the reconstructions by economic category are based on the RGS volume 
(1969). From 1968, the data was taken from the General Financial Statement of the Italian State and from 2003, from 
the general “statements” of the RGS data warehouse. 
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Appendix B. Government spending by functional category 
 
Functional category Functional categories in 
the budget documents 
from 1998 to 2009 
Functional categories in 
the budget documents 
from 1968 to 1997 
Reconstruction of the 
RGS (General 
Accounting Office) 
volume (1969) for the 
years from 1862 to 1967 
9 
National defence 
National defence Section II - National defence National defence 
 Section XVII – Civil 
protection and public 
disasters 
10 
Justice and Public safety 
Public order and safety  Section IV – Public safety Public safety 
   Section III - Justice Justice 
11 
Economic actions and 
interventions 
Economic affairs  Section XVI – Economic 
works and interventions not 
attributable to specific areas 
etc. 
Economic interventions 
 Section XIV – Trade and 
industry 
Environmental protection Section XIII – Agriculture 
and food 
  Section XV – Interventions 
in depressed areas 
 Section XVII – Regional 
and local finance 
  Section XII - Transport, 
navigation and 
communications 
Transport and 
communications 
   
12 
Social actions and 
interventions 
Social protection Section IX  - Work and 
social security 
Social interventions 
Section X – Public 
assistance 
Health Section XI – Health and 
hygiene 
13 
Education and culture 
Recreational, cultural and 
religious activities 
Section VI – Education and 
culture 
Education and culture 
(excluding religion) 
Education Section VII – Universities 
and scientific research 
    
Source: RGS (2011). From 1862 to 1967, the reconstructions by functional category are based on the RGS volume 
(1969). From 1968, the data was taken from the General Financial Statement of the Italian State and from 2003, from 
the general “statements” of the RGS data warehouse. 
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Appendix C. Ratio between the definition of economic and functional 
categories of government spending used in the empirical analysis and 
the expenditure categories used in the State budget.  
 
Economic and functional categories 
used in the empirical analysis 
References to the expenditure categories 
used in the State budget (Appendices B and 
C) 
Public current spending  
1 + 4 
Public capital spending  
3 + 5 
Total public spending 1 + 3 + 4 + 5+6+8 
Public spending for staff  
2 
Public spending for interests  
6 
Public spending for national defence  
9 
Public spending for justice and public 
safety 
 
10 
 
Public spending for economic 
interventions 
 
11 
 
Public spending for social 
interventions 
 
12 
 
Public spending for education and 
culture 
 
13 
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